Previous research has demonstrated that the subjective danger and usefulness of words affect lexical decision times. Usually, an interaction is found: Increasing danger predicts faster reaction times (RTs) for words low on usefulness, but increasing danger predicts slower RTs for words high on usefulness. The authors show the same interaction with immediate auditory naming. The interaction disappeared with a delayed auditory naming control experiment, suggesting that it has a perceptual basis. In an attempt to separate input (signal to ear) from output (brain to muscle) processes in word recognition, the authors ran 2 auditory perceptual identification experiments. The interaction was again significant, but performance was best for words high on both danger and usefulness. This suggests that initial demonstrations of the interaction were reflecting an output approach/withdraw response conflict induced by stimuli that are both dangerous and useful. The interaction cannot be characterized as a tradeoff of speed versus accuracy.
The access and integration of semantic information are of paramount importance in word recognition. These processes must be very fast and efficient as listeners can easily comprehend speakers producing several words per second. In spite of this, in most models of auditory word recognition, a word's meaning is not accessed until after that word has been recognized. An exception to this is the model of Marslen- Wilson (1987) , in which the first 150 ms of a spoken word suffices for activation of at least some aspects of word meanings (see also Zwitserlood, 1989) . This amount of acoustic input is rarely enough to uniquely identify a spoken word, which implies then that some aspects of meaning are activated before the recognition of any single word. Other activation and competition-based models (e.g., TRACE [McClelland & Elman, 1986] and the neighborhood activation model [Luce, Pisoni, & Goldinger, 1990] ) make similar claims but do not have implemented semantic levels (Moss, McCormick, & Tyler, 1997) .
The discussion of semantic processing in models of visual word recognition primarily concerns two sets of findings: evidence for concreteness facilitation and mixed evidence for a semantic ambiguity effect. Explanations for these effects almost exclusively rely upon top-down facilitation and variation in lexico-semantic structure (e.g., Adelman, Brown, & Quesada, 2006; Azuma & Van Orden, 1997; Buchanan, Westbury, & Burgess, 2001; Pexman & Lupker, 1999; Rodd, Gaskell, & Marslen-Wilson, 2002) . We discuss alternatives to these conceptualizations below. We would expect the mechanisms of semantic processing to be similar for auditory and for visual word recognition, except possibly for specifics of auditory processing that have to do with the temporally distributed nature of speech or for effects of translating orthography to phonology in visual word recognition.
While controlling for variables such as concreteness/ imageability, polysemy, age of acquisition, and so on, Wurm (2007; see also Wurm & Vakoch, 2000; Wurm, Vakoch, Aycock, & Childers, 2003; Wurm, Whitman, Seaman, Hill, & Ulstad, 2007) showed that auditory processing times are related to the danger and usefulness of word referents. Similar patterns of results have been observed with visual lexical decision times (Wurm, 2006; Wurm, Vakoch, Seaman, & Buchanan, 2004) and visual naming times (Wurm, 2006) . These semantic constructs were chosen because they were believed to have a more obvious value or purpose for the perceiver than some other widely studied connotative variables, such as evaluation/valence, potency, and activity (e.g., Vakoch & Wurm, 1997; Wurm & Vakoch, 1996; .
Across these studies, there are two robust findings. First, there is a large facilitative effect of judged usefulness on lexical decision times. Items with useful connotations (e.g., food, water, or tree) have faster reaction times (RTs) than those with useless connotations (skunk, lint, or tobacco), even after controlling for several potentially confounding variables. Second, danger and usefulness nearly always interact: Increasing danger is associated with faster RTs for words rated low on usefulness but with slower RTs for words rated high on usefulness. For example, butterfly and poison have similarly low usefulness ratings, but poison gets much higher danger ratings and would have faster RTs. Fire and blanket have similarly high usefulness ratings but differ substantially on danger ratings. Here, the higher danger word tends to have slower RTs.
We have interpreted the RT cost for these high-danger plus high-usefulness items as an indication that the stimulus has engaged both approach and withdraw response tendencies (Wurm, 2007) . The idea of a relationship between stimulus valence, approach/withdrawal, and adaptiveness for survival is not new (e.g., Lewin, 1935; Schneirla, 1959) , and many priming studies with affectively marked stimuli have shown effects of semantic or affective information (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; Neumann & Strack, 2000) . Our work has used more random and exhaustive samples of nonmarked stimuli, and we have never used priming paradigms. We believe that the approach/withdraw tendencies can be observed as an ordinary part of the word recognition process (Wurm, 2007) .
Most theorists would agree that perception operates in the service of action, and yet, the historic division between models of perception/recognition on the one hand and models of motor movement on the other hand has persisted. In the approach we envision, there is a linkage of perceptual system to motor system (and vice versa) that leaves a measurable trace. That is, motoric effects are observable already in basic perceptual acts. We wish to extend what have come to be called situated or embodied cognition approaches (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997; Lakoff, 1987;  cf. Lewin, 1935) , though these have tended to be concerned with image schemas, categorization performance, and memory rather than the abstract task of word recognition.
A semantics/motor-response link has been demonstrated in a number of studies. For example, Chen and Bargh (1999) found that participants were faster to pull than push a lever when categorizing positive stimuli but that the reverse held for negative stimuli. Some theorists argue further (as we do) that the link is bidirectional, with stimulus evaluations influencing motor responses but also with these motor responses influencing stimulus evaluations (see, e.g., Neumann, Förster, & Strack, 2003) . In a recent example of this, Beilock and Holt (2007) demonstrated that expert but not novice typists have a preference for letter pairs that are typed with opposite hands (e.g., FJ as opposed to FV). Participants were unable to explain how the letter pairs were different (and thus why they preferred one pair over the other). Interestingly, the effect was weakened if the raters had to perform a motor activity during the preference task but only if that motor task involved the particular fingers that would be used to type the letters. Beilock and Holt interpreted this as evidence of covert sensorimotor simulation during the preference judgments. We take this as further evidence that the underlying link between action and perception goes much deeper than is supposed by nearly all current models of perception. Evidence of this link can be seen in behavior even in tasks where there is no reason to expect to see such effects (Wurm, 2007) .
How might such a semantic/motor link operate in a process such as the naming or lexical decision task? One possibility is that during word recognition, a word such as fire activates independent semantic representations that correspond to usefulness and danger and that these two representations mutually inhibit each other at the semantic level. There would thus be a lower degree of topdown semantic activation occurring from semantics to phonology, which would hurt performance. An alternative is that attention is automatically drawn to the semantic level once these conflicting representations are activated, leaving fewer resources available for processing at lower levels of the system. We favor a third alternative, which is also attentional. Instead of attention being diverted from phonemic to semantic processing, it is diverted from both to programming or execution of an actual motor response. By motor response here, we mean a real-world action and not just a button press in an experiment (we return to this point below). The diverting of attention would take some processing resources away from the lab-based task (e.g., lexical decision), and so, performance would be expected to suffer. The current study provides data that helped us begin to sort these options out.
Lexical decision remains the most widely used task for such research, but it has been criticized as susceptible to strategic effects and postperceptual bias (e.g., Balota, 1990; Balota & Chumbley, 1984; Neely, 1991; Neely & Keefe, 1989) . While the naming task is preferable to lexical decision in some ways, it tends to show fewer, smaller effects than lexical decision (e.g., Baayen, Feldman, & Schreuder, 2006; Baayen, Wurm, & Aycock, in press) . It also involves a mixture of perceptual and production-related processes. This can complicate interpretation of the results. That is, a variable shown to affect immediate naming times could be having its effect on perception only, on production only, or on a combination of both.
The delayed naming task was developed to allow researchers to address this undesirable aspect of the standard (immediate) naming task (e.g., Balota & Chumbley, 1985; Monsell, Doyle, & Haggard, 1989) , but the task has rarely (if ever) been used with auditory word naming. Typically, participants are presented a word visually, followed by a cue that lets the participants know that they should name the word. Because it is believed that the participant has recognized the word before the cue, any significant differences in RTs measured from the cue are hypothesized to reflect processes related to production of the vocal response (specifically, those processes that cannot be prepared during the delay). The current study used the same logic in an attempt to understand previous demonstrations of danger and usefulness effects.
The nature of the Danger ϫ Usefulness interaction needs to be explored further, in part because it seems counterintuitive that words highly relevant to a perceiver (i.e., those high on danger and usefulness) would be recognized most slowly. This has led us to question just what is meant by the term recognition. Recognition of a spoken word can be conceptualized as having at least two components: an input component (i.e., the signal's path between ear and brain) and an output component (i.e., the connection between brain and muscle). Traditionally, models of word recognition have concerned themselves exclusively with the input component.
Research on the psychological refractory period may help in the interpretation of lexical and perceptual effects. Much of this work has used dual-task paradigms in an attempt to characterize attentional effects during language processing (e.g., Cleland, Gaskell, Quinlan, & Tamminen, 2006; McCann, Remington, & Van Selst, 2000 ; see also Johnston, McCann, & Remington, 1995; Wurm & Samuel, 1997) . One conclusion from such research is that word frequency, for example, can be conceptualized as having both input and output components, where output has to do with executing a response to an initial stimulus prior to or concurrent with input processing on a second stimulus (the so-called attentional bottleneck).
The output component can be conceptualized in at least two different ways, though. It might consist of nothing more interesting than the execution of whatever experiment-specific response is required, such as a button press. The assumption can be made here that the output part of the recognition process is more or less a constant that can be ignored, so this conceptualization sheds no light on the Danger ϫ Usefulness interaction described above.
Alternatively, the output component might be assumed to reflect real-world action possibilities such as fight/flight, approach, gathering, or foraging. Output processes conceptualized in this way would have quite different effects for each word, depending crucially on that word's connotative semantics. Models of word recognition have had nothing to say about these things as they are assumed to be beyond their scopes.
In the current article, we argue for this latter, broader conceptualization of the output component of recognition and for a model of word recognition in which perception and action are linked together at a fairly low level in the system. In our framework, output processes relevant for real-world action are important in perceptual tasks, just as are input (signal) processes.
Input processing in standard speeded tasks is very fast and efficient; so much so, we believe, that it is difficult to observe input processing without also seeing at least some evidence of output effects. A task that gets recognition performance off the ceiling might be useful in this regard. Perceptual identification is one such task. It places a premium on correctly recognizing stimuli but does not (usually) incorporate a speed component. Stimuli are presented in a degraded form. The dependent variable in this task is not RT but instead is a readily understood facet of language comprehension: recognition accuracy.
We explored the nature and extent of the previously demonstrated Danger ϫ Usefulness interaction using the following tasks: immediate auditory naming, which is believed to be much less susceptible to contamination from postperceptual sources than is lexical decision; delayed auditory naming, which is used to assess whether the immediate naming results are simply effects of articulator movements (e.g., Balota & Chumbley, 1985; Monsell et al., 1989) ; unspeeded perceptual identification, which we used in an attempt to distinguish input from output effects; and noisy (immediate) naming, which uses the stimuli from the perceptual identification task. This can be thought of as a speeded perceptual identification task.
Predictions
Even though other models do not address variables like danger and usefulness, we were able to make a number of predictions for the current study.
1. We expected a Danger ϫ Usefulness interaction in immediate naming, such that words high on both danger and usefulness would have slower RTs. Our previous work showed this type of interaction with lexical decision and naming.
2. We did not expect danger and usefulness to interact in delayed naming. This was based on our belief that the interaction is a perceptual effect, while delayed naming data should be more influenced by production-related variables. We assumed that with long enough delays, the input and the real-world output parts of perception would be completed. All that remained would be the task-specific output, which we did not believe to be related to danger and usefulness.
3. We expected danger and usefulness to interact in perceptual identification because we believed the effect to be perceptual. The nature of any such interaction is difficult to predict but would help us differentiate among the various accounts outlined above. For example, if the previously observed interaction is caused by attentional resources being diverted from the recognition task to (pre)programming of a motor response, we would not expect to see that particular pattern in perceptual identification. Making the perceptual task much more difficult should cause more attention to be devoted to it, and so, what should be observed would be a reflection of resting activation or recognition threshold levels or perhaps an indication of perceivers' guessing biases in the face of ambiguous information. It could well be that words high on both danger and usefulness show better performance. Although this is not the pattern we observed previously, it would be reasonable given the presumed survival-related salience of such stimuli.
Preliminary Rating Study
To make cross-study comparison more straightforward, we used a subset of the stimuli from Wurm and Vakoch (2000) for this study. Danger and usefulness values were therefore available, but we conducted a preliminary rating study to determine whether presentation modality mattered: Rating participants in Wurm and Vakoch saw printed stimuli, while the lexical decision participants heard spoken versions of the stimuli.
Method
Participants. Twenty-six Wayne State University (Detroit, MI) students participated in the study for course credit. All were native speakers of English. Half of the participants made danger ratings during their first session, while the other half made usefulness ratings. Participants returned to the lab at least 1 week later and made ratings on the other dimension.
Materials. Wurm and Vakoch (2000) used 100 common nouns as stimuli. In the current study, we used the subset of those items that have a concreteness value listed in the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Wilson, 1988) and that are not homophones (e.g., ant, wood, and moose) . This left us with 72 stimuli, which are listed in the Appendix.
New recordings were used in this and the following experiments. Each stimulus was read by a male native speaker of English who was unfamiliar with the purpose of the study, digitized at a sampling rate of 20 kHz (low-pass filtered at 9.8 kHz), and stored in a disc file.
Procedure. Participants were run individually. Participants were instructed to rate each word on its danger or usefulness to human survival. Participants used a computer keyboard to input the numbers 1 through 8 in response to each word; if a word was unknown, participants were to press the 0 key. A scale was presented on a computer monitor during each trial to remind participants that 1 was to correspond to low usefulness or danger and 8 to high usefulness or danger. Stimuli were presented over headphones, in a different random order for each participant. A practice set of 12 items allowed the participant to get used to the task.
Ratings from trials in which a 0 was given (indicating the participant did not know the word) were removed (Ͻ1% of trials). The mean rating for danger was 3.34 (SD ϭ 2.10), with a range of 1.12 (apple and butterfly) to 7.92 (cancer). The mean rating for usefulness was 3.84 (SD ϭ 1.64), with a range of 1.58 (balloon) to 8.00 (food). Danger ratings correlated .97 with those from Wurm and Vakoch (2000) ; usefulness ratings correlated .96 (both ps Ͻ .001). It appears, then, that presentation modality had little effect on the ratings obtained. Ratings obtained with auditory presentation, though, were retained for use in the current study.
Calculation of Other Predictor Variables
Word frequency was taken from the CELEX database (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Gulikers, 1995) . Word length was computed in milliseconds. The uniqueness point (UP) location was measured as the point (in milliseconds) in the acoustic signal of each word that the word diverges from all other words (Marslen-Wilson, 1987; MarslenWilson & Welsh, 1978) . The temporal center of this phoneme was used as the UP value, following Radeau, Mousty, and Bertelson (1989) . Bigram frequency was taken from the published tables of Mayzner and Tresselt (1965) . Number of competitors was calculated as the number of words that share all the phonemes of a word up to (but not including) its UP. This is a version of neighborhood density that takes into account the temporal nature of auditory stimuli. Concreteness/imageability values were taken from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Wilson, 1988) . Note that while some researchers consider concreteness and imageability different constructs, many use the terms interchangeably; Wurm (2007) found that they correlate greater than .90. We included several word onset characteristics: first-syllable stress, vowel vs. consonant onset, place of articulation of the onset phoneme, and onset phoneme voicing. Finally, trial number was included in an attempt to reduce variance due to either practice effects or fatigue. Our primary interest in these variables was to rule out alternative explanations for any effects of danger and/or usefulness that we found.
1 Table 1 shows summary statistics for the regressor variables included in our main analyses. Table 2 shows the regressor intercorrelations.
Experiment 1: Immediate Naming

Method
Participants. Participants were 29 undergraduate students at Wayne State University enrolled in a psychology course. All participants had normal hearing and were native speakers of English. They received extra credit in a psychology course for their participation.
Materials. Stimuli were the same acoustic tokens created in connection with the preliminary rating study, described above.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a soundattenuating booth. The speech files were played over headphones at a comfortable listening level, with 1,500 ms between trials. Participants were instructed to repeat each word as quickly and accurately as possible into a microphone positioned approximately 10 cm away. The stimulus order was randomized for each participant by the experimental software, which also recorded the latency from the onset of stimulus presentation to activation of the voice key. A practice set of 12 words was used prior to the main experiment to familiarize participants with the procedure.
Data analysis. We analyzed the data set with a linear mixedeffect (multilevel) analysis of covariance, with log RT as the dependent variable and participant as random effect (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000) . 2 In our analyses, several predictors were log transformed to remove the skewness in their distributions and to minimize the effect of atypical outliers: word frequency, UP location, item duration, danger and usefulness ratings, and number of auditory competitors. In addition, the distributions of concreteness values and bigram frequencies had severe negative skew. These values were inverse, reflect, and square root transformed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001 ; we then multiplied the transformed values by Ϫ1 so that the regression coefficients could be interpreted directly).
1 While several other variables are conceivably of interest here (e.g., polysemy, age of acquisition), in the current study we focused on those that were included in the previous studies using these stimuli. This stimulus set is fairly small (72 items), and inclusion of more and more variables makes statistical collinearity a serious problem. In addition, the item distributions on these variables are far from ideal-for example, fewer than half of our items have an age of acquisition value available. A study just completed, with good item distributions and more than twice as many items, showed conclusively that uncontrolled polysemy and age of acquisition do not account for our results (Wurm, 2007) .
2 This is an extension of the repeated-measures regression analysis suggested by Lorch and Myers (1990) . The analyses produce identical regression coefficients but differ substantially in what should be considered the degrees of freedom. Our analysis considers the degrees of freedom to be equal to the number of observations minus the number of parameters in the model. In the Lorch and Myers analysis, the degrees of freedom are roughly equal to the number of items (72 in the current study). Once the number of items exceeds 40 or 50, it makes little practical difference because the t distribution becomes increasingly indistinguishable from the standard normal distribution. At this point, we may assume that any two-tailed t more extreme than Ϯ1.96 would be significant. Note. Transformed values were used in all analyses. a These distributions were log transformed to remove positive skewness. b These distributions had severe negative skew, so the values were inverse, reflect, and square root transformed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) . We then multiplied the transformed values by Ϫ1 to aid interpretation of the coefficients (see the Data analysis section of Experiment 1).
We explored potential nonlinearities by allowing quadratic terms into the statistical models. As these are the first demonstrations of significant quadratic effects of danger and usefulness, it is wise to guard against overinterpretation of the precise shapes of the functions or the precise point at which a curve reaches a peak or trough. This is especially true in terms of the interactions. If additional research confirms the observed patterns, then a more specific interpretation and explanation of the crossover points will be required.
Results and Discussion
Trials on which the participant produced the wrong word were not included in this analysis (2.1% of the trials). In addition, we excluded any RTs faster than 150 ms from item onset (Ͻ1% of the data) or slower than 2.5 standard deviations above the overall mean (1.0%). Table 3 shows the regression model predicting log naming times. Of primary interest are the danger and usefulness effects (both linear and quadratic) and their interaction. Figure 1 shows the significant usefulness effect. This figure was made by plotting the regression equation, with all continuous variables held constant at their medians (except usefulness, which was a vector running from 1 to 8). The usefulness effect is large and robust across our other studies, but in the current study, we see that there appears to have been little effect of usefulness for the very lowest values. It appears that some intermediate value of usefulness must be reached before the expected facilitative effect becomes observable. There was similarly a main effect for danger. The linear and quadratic coefficients are such that here, too, some intermediate value (roughly 3 on the 8-point scale) needs to be reached before facilitation is observed.
Interpretation of both the danger and usefulness effects has to be tempered by consideration of their significant interaction, which is shown in Figure 2 . We again plotted the regression equation, using the median values for all continuous variables in the model except for danger and usefulness. In making the plot, danger was a vector that ran from the natural log of 1 to the natural log of 8 (1-8 representing the number scale used to make the ratings). For high or low usefulness, a value one standard deviation above or below the median (respectively) was used. Readers are reminded that both danger and usefulness were continuous variables that were not dichotomized for the statistical analysis.
As the figure shows, if we had been assessing only linear effects, the outcome would have been similar to what we have previously observed: As usefulness increases from low to high, the (linear) slope of the danger effect becomes increasingly inhibitory (Wurm & Vakoch, 2000; Wurm, Vakoch, Seaman, & Buchanan, 2004; Wurm et al., 2007) . However, as is clear from the figure, there was significant curvilinearity in the effects. As with the usefulness main effect in Figure 1 , it is not until some intermediate value of danger is reached that the expected slopes become apparent. At lower levels of danger, what is observed is primarily a large facilitative main effect of usefulness.
Having established that danger and usefulness ratings interact in predicting immediate naming times, we now turn to performance in several delayed naming conditions. Experiment 2: Delayed Naming 3
As described above, the delayed naming paradigm provides insights into the relative contributions of perceptual versus production processes. Three levels of delay were chosen: 333 ms, 667 ms, and 1,000 ms. Analysis of RTs from , who used similar items and procedures, showed that by 333 ms postoffset, roughly half of all responses had been initiated. By 667 ms postoffset, roughly 85% of responses had been initiated. All responses had been initiated by 1,000 ms postoffset. These levels of delay then were chosen to provide windows into different portions of the overall processing time line.
Method
Participants. Participants were 89 undergraduate students at Wayne State University enrolled in a psychology course. Thirty students participated in the 333-ms delay condition, 29 in the 667-ms delay condition, and 30 in the 1,000-ms delay condition. Delay was manipulated between participants to reduce the cognitive complexity of the task and encourage fast responses. All participants had normal hearing and were native speakers of English. They received extra credit in a psychology course for their participation.
Materials. The same stimuli used in the preliminary rating study and Experiment 1 were used. A 100-ms, 400-Hz cuing tone was used. The tone sounded either 333, 667, or 1,000 ms after the offset of each stimulus.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a soundattenuating booth. The speech files were played over headphones at a comfortable listening level, with 1,500 ms between trials. Participants were instructed to repeat each word as quickly and accurately as possible but not before hearing the cuing tone.
Results and Discussion
Data were analyzed in the same way as described in Experiment 1.
4 Trials on which the participant produced the wrong word were not included in this analysis. This amounted to 3.4%, 4.5%, and 7.6% of the trials for the 333-ms, 667-ms, and 1,000-ms delays, respectively. In addition, we excluded any RTs faster than 150 ms from onset of the cuing tone (1.2%, Ͻ1%, Ͻ1%). We also excluded any RTs slower than 2.5 standard deviations above the overall mean for each condition (2.9%, Ͻ1%, 1.6%).
333-ms delay condition. Table 4 shows the regression model for predicting log naming time in the 333-ms delay condition. Significant predictors of delayed naming times were trial number, item duration, voicing of the onset phoneme, number of auditory competitors, and usefulness (both linear and quadratic effects). With the exception of the competitor measure, these variables were also significant predictors of immediate naming times in Experiment 1. The duration effect, though, had the opposite sign. In Experiment 1, naming of longer items took longer to initiate. After a delay, naming of longer items is initiated faster than pronunci- ation of shorter items. We hypothesize that this effect was due to use of stimulus offset as the onset of the delay period. For longer words, the delay onset was later, providing participants with more time to prepare their responses.
Of central importance in the current study, naming times following a 333-ms delay were not related to danger ratings (linear or quadratic), and there was no hint of interaction between danger and usefulness ratings (linear or quadratic). We discuss the significant usefulness effect below.
667-ms delay condition. Table 5 shows the regression model for predicting log naming time in the 667-ms delay condition. Significant predictors of delayed naming times were trial number, item duration, voicing of the onset phoneme, and usefulness (both linear and quadratic effects). All of these effects were in the same direction as the corresponding effects in the 333-ms delay condition. Naming times following a 667-ms delay were not related to danger ratings (linear or quadratic), and there was no hint of interaction between danger and usefulness ratings (linear or quadratic). Figure 3 shows the significant usefulness effects for the 333-ms and 667-ms delay conditions. Comparison with Figure 1 shows that the shape and magnitude of the effects are fairly similar (about .06 log units, or 25-30 ms).
1,000-ms delay condition. Table 6 shows the regression model for predicting log naming time in the 1,000-ms delay condition. Significant predictors of delayed naming times were trial number, item duration, and voicing of the onset phoneme. These effects were in the same direction as the corresponding effects in the 333-ms and 667-ms delay conditions. In addition, there was an unexpected inhibitory effect of concreteness: More concrete items were named more slowly. Naming times following a 1,000-ms delay were not related to danger or usefulness ratings (linear or quadratic), and there was no hint of interaction between danger and usefulness ratings (linear or quadratic). Table 7 presents a summary of all conditions in Experiments 1 and 2. Examination of the table shows a clear distinction: Effects tended to be significant either in all (or none) of the four conditions or only in the immediate condition.
Summary of Immediate and Delayed Naming Results
Two variables had unexpected effects for which we do not currently have explanations. One is neighborhood density, which was significant only at the shortest delay. In previous studies it was a robust predictor of auditory lexical decision and (immediate) naming times (Wurm, 2007; Wurm et al., 2007; Wurm & Ross, 2001) . The other variable is concreteness, which had the expected facilitative effect in the immediate condition but had an inhibitory effect in the 1,000-ms delay condition. It was not significant at the intermediate delays.
We expected to see effects of production-related variables in the delay conditions. Logically, these should include those we used as voice-key control variables: place of articulation, vowel versus consonant onset, and voicing of the onset phoneme. The voicing variable was significant at all delays, but the other two were not. Vowel onset was in fact never significant, but this probably has to do with the overlap between this variable's distribution and that of the voicing variable (a vowel onset is necessarily voiced, so, in some sense, these variables are providing redundant information). In fact, reanalysis after removing the voicing variable from the statistical models revealed that vowel onset was a significant predictor in all three delay conditions (all ps Ͻ .001) but not in the immediate condition. Place of articulation was significant in the immediate condition, marginally significant in the 333-ms delay condition, and not significant for the two longest delays. It is probable that the delay gives the participant time to get his or her articulators into position, reducing the importance of this variable as the length of the delay increases. With one exception discussed below, the only variables consistently significant in delayed naming are the voicing of the onset phoneme, trial number, and item duration. These are not effects that we would expect to disappear even with preparation time. Trial number simply indexes practice or fatigue effects, and item duration is an unchangeable physical characteristic of the stimulus itself. Also, while a participant can move his or her articulators into position during a delay, it is unlikely that he or she can begin the voicing process prior to the warning tone.
Several other effects were significant only in the immediate condition and thus can be interpreted as being primarily perceptual effects. These include the location of the UP, which is a formrelated variable but one expected to be relevant chiefly before the signal has been recognized. Likewise, bigram frequency did not predict any delayed naming latencies, although its effect was significantly facilitative in immediate naming. Importantly, word frequency effects were not observed in the delayed naming conditions. Because previous delayed naming studies were inconsis- Figure 3 . Predicted log naming latency as a function of log usefulness rating and delay condition. Usefulness was not significant in the 1,000-ms delay condition. tent regarding this variable, we could not predict the behavior of word frequency in our delayed naming task. However, our study can be read as contributing toward a growing consensus, including a majority of delayed naming studies using visual stimuli, that word frequency effects are perceptual and perhaps even semantic (e.g., Baayen et al., 2006) .
Experiment 3: Perceptual Identification in Noise
In the perceptual identification task, stimuli are presented at or near threshold levels, and participants are instructed to identify the stimulus. In visual presentation, this is typically accomplished through tachistoscopes, while, in auditory presentation, white noise is used. By presenting the stimuli using amplitudes at or below those of accompanying white noise, identification can be made difficult for participants.
The perceptual identification task is commonly viewed as data driven (Thapar & Greene, 1994) and differs from standard naming and lexical decision in that participants must simply try to disambiguate the signal rather than to process it at high speed. This does not mean that the task is bias free (e.g., Ratcliff, Allbritton, & McKoon, 1997) , which would be unlikely given both the length of time participants are given to respond and the ambiguity presented by the stimuli. However, it would seem that the biases inherent in the task are related to the uptake of the signal, rather than having anything to do with the production of a written (in this case) response.
Many factors contribute to recognition probability. It is expected that high-frequency words will be recognized more often (e.g., Broadbent, 1967) . However, this may be true only after controlling for word duration (longer words, while less frequent, are more acoustically distinctive). These variables, as well as all the others included in the RT analyses above, were included as controls in this experiment.
The central question in this experiment concerns the danger and usefulness effects, specifically the interaction. If results like those shown in Figure 2 are due solely to an approach-withdraw response conflict, then no danger and usefulness effects should be evident in recognition accuracy scores. Presumably, these words would be subject to identical input recognition processes as other words, and global response latencies would be driven by the hypothesized differences in the output process. However, if these variables affect how words are recognized in the first place (i.e., the input portion of the process), then their effects should be observable in this task as well. As noted in the introduction, though, any such effects may be of a different nature than those we have previously seen.
Method
Participants. Seventy-two undergraduate students from the Wayne State University psychology subject pool participated. All were native speakers of English with normal hearing. Participants received extra credit in a psychology course for their participation. Fourteen participants were tested in preliminary sessions designed to find an appropriate signal-to-noise ratio (we wanted mean recognition levels below 65%). After a final signal-to-noise ratio was selected, 58 different participants were tested. It is their responses that were analyzed. Materials. The stimuli used in this study were the digital speech files used in Experiment 1. Prior to presentation, these stimuli were digitally transformed using an algorithm that added signal-dependent but uncorrelated noise to each sample (Benki, 2003; Schroeder, 1968) . As a result, quiet samples remained quiet, and loud samples remained loud, but overall, each word was distorted. Before this manipulation, the root-mean-square amplitudes of the stimuli were equated (at the same root-mean-square value used in the previous experiments). The signal-to-noise ratio used for the 58 participants was Ϫ7 dB.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a soundattenuating booth. The speech files were played over headphones at a comfortable listening level, with 5 s between trials. Participants were instructed to write down each word they heard. Accuracy of spelling was not emphasized, and guessing was encouraged. The stimulus order was randomized for each participant. A practice set of 12 words was presented prior to the main experiment to familiarize participants with the procedure.
Results and Discussion
Responses were coded as correct or incorrect by one of the authors. A response was coded as correct if it was the word that had been presented or a misspelling or pluralization of that word. Mean accuracy was 59%. We analyzed the data by using a generalized linear mixed-effects model, in which the fixed effects were fit using penalized quasi likelihood (e.g., Venables & Ripley, 2002) . This analysis is analogous to those presented above but is appropriate for the dichotomous dependent variable. The same predictor variables were included.
Results of this analysis are shown in Table 8 . Positive coefficients indicate a higher likelihood of correct identification. Higher likelihood of recognition was associated with words having either a voiced or a vowel onset. Words occurring later in the task were recognized more accurately (i.e., we observed a practice effect). Longer words and words with earlier UPs were recognized better, which together suggest that with more distinctive acoustic information, participants were more likely to correctly guess a word's identity. Words with animate referents were more likely to be recognized, as were those with higher frequency. These last two variables were associated with faster RTs in Experiment 1, and we have also found them to predict faster RTs and lower error rates in auditory lexical decision .
Of central importance to the current study, there was a significant effect of danger as well as a Danger ϫ Usefulness interaction. This interaction is shown in Figure 4 . The nature of the interaction is not what we have previously observed: For words low on usefulness, there is little or no effect of danger; for words high on usefulness, there is a much stronger, curvilinear effect of danger that is initially inhibitory before becoming very facilitative. The words with the highest probability of recognition were those rated high on both danger and usefulness, even after controlling for concreteness, frequency, and several lexical, acoustic, and taskrelated variables.
In the perceptual identification experiment, recognition is intentionally made difficult, and correct recognition is not a given.
Overall recognition performance suffers with the introduction of noise, but it suffers the least for the items high on both dimensions, perhaps because of their special relevance to matters of crucial importance to the perceiver. Our interpretation is that the perceptual system places a premium on recognition of words high on these connotative dimensions, either by using this information in guessing strategies, by coding the information into lexical entries, or by somehow using it to adjust resting activation levels or recognition thresholds.
Before we could be confident about this interpretation, we needed to rule out a viable alternative. The words with high recognition likelihoods in the current experiment were of course just those words that had the slowest recognition times in Experiment 1, r(70) ϭ .204, p Ͻ .05, one-tailed, and in previous studies. It is conceivable, then, that the pattern we have previously observed is the RT aspect of a speed-accuracy tradeoff. To check this, we performed a regression analysis on the by-item accuracy rates for the naming responses in Experiment 1 (arcsine transformed because there were very few errors made on those nondegraded stimuli). Figure 5 shows the Danger ϫ Usefulness interaction in this post hoc analysis. This interaction did not approach significance, but the pattern is important to see visually because it unambiguously rules out the speed-accuracy tradeoff explanation. That is, if Figure 5 looked qualitatively anything like Figure 4 , then the tradeoff explanation would be viable. The explanation is not viable because, if anything, danger hurts accuracy for the items high on usefulness in the speeded naming task.
Experiment 4: Noisy Naming Experiment 3 produced a reversal of the typical interaction between danger and usefulness. Our hypothesis was that this reversal is due to the substantially increased difficulty of the recognition task, but it is also possible that the removal of time pressure for participants' responses was the cause. In a final experiment, we sought to determine whether it was the increased difficulty or the absence of time pressure. Experiment 4 is a replication of Experiment 1 but with the noisy stimuli from Experiment 3.
Method
Participants. Participants were 12 undergraduate students at Wayne State University enrolled in a psychology course. All participants had normal hearing and were native speakers of English. They received extra credit in a psychology course for their participation. None participated in any of the previous experiments.
Materials. Stimuli were the same acoustic tokens used in Experiment 3.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. A practice set of 12 words was presented prior to the main experiment to familiarize participants with the procedure.
Data analysis. The data analyses were the same as those presented in Experiments 1-3.
Results and Discussion
Responses were coded as correct or incorrect by the same method used in Experiment 3. Mean accuracy was 60%.
Results of the statistical analysis on errors are shown in Table 9 . The significant interaction between danger and usefulness is shown in Figure 6 , which looks very much like Figure 4 . This indicates that the reversal of the typical interaction was not due to the absence of a speed requirement in Experiment 3. Instead, it seems to have been due to the perceptual task being made considerably more difficult.
We also analyzed the RTs for those trials on which the participant produced the correct answer. In addition to excluding the trials on which the participant produced the wrong word, we excluded any RTs faster than 150 ms (2.5% of the data) or more than 2.5 standard deviations above the overall mean (1.0%). Table 10 shows the regression model predicting log naming times. Figure 7 shows the significant Danger ϫ Usefulness interaction. Comparison with Figures 4 and 6 indicates that we do not have a speed-accuracy tradeoff to qualify our conclusions. Indeed, in this context of difficult recognition, items high on both danger and usefulness have a higher chance of being identified correctly, and when they are, they are identified more quickly.
General Discussion
Nearly all previous demonstrations of the Danger ϫ Usefulness interaction used the auditory lexical decision task, but in the current study, we found very clear evidence of similar effects in immediate auditory naming. As argued previously, we believe that the interaction shows the effects of behaviorally relevant information on the basic perceptual processes involved in word recognition. Our specific interest has focused on the combination of high Figure 4 . Predicted accuracy as a function of log danger and usefulness ratings. L means low usefulness, and H means high usefulness (defined as one standard deviation below and above the median, respectively). Neither danger nor usefulness was dichotomized for the statistical analysis. Data are from the perceptual identification task. Figure 5 . Predicted arcsine-transformed accuracy as a function of log danger and usefulness ratings. L means low usefulness, and H means high usefulness (defined as one standard deviation below and above the median, respectively). Neither danger nor usefulness was dichotomized for the statistical analysis. Data are from Experiment 1 (the immediate, no-delay naming condition). This interaction was not significant, but it is shown to help rule out alternative explanations for the reaction time interaction that are based on a speed/accuracy tradeoff. usefulness and high danger, a combination that we hypothesize engages both approach and avoid response tendencies. It is here that we see an increase in RTs associated with rising danger ratings (and a concomitant increase, though not significant, in error rates). Our use of the naming task rules out explanations having to do with postperceptual contamination in the lexical decision task and suggests that the effects need to be modeled as relatively low-level perceptual effects. That we found almost no effects of danger or usefulness in the delayed naming task suggests that the effects are not primarily related to production.
In a third task, perceptual identification in noise, the Danger ϫ Usefulness interaction was again present, though of a different nature: Performance for items high on both danger and usefulness was not poorest, as in the other tasks, but best. There was little effect of danger on recognition likelihood for items rated low on usefulness, but increasing danger was associated with better recognition for items rated high on usefulness. On the face of it, this suggests that previous demonstrations of the interaction might be due to a speed-accuracy tradeoff. The analysis of errors in immediate naming showed this not to be the case. 5 In Experiment 4, we replicated the reversal both in accuracy and in RTs, confirming that the reversal was not due to the absence of a speed element in participant responding.
The fact that we see mirror-image interactions depending on the difficulty of the task supports our conjecture that lexical processing can be characterized as having a measurable output component in addition to the obviously important input component. Data from our perceptual identification experiments suggest that items high on danger and usefulness have a preferential recognition status (or prior bias, in the terminology of Broadbent, 1967) . Nevertheless, data from Experiment 1 and our previous studies show that these items suffer a measurable processing cost in standard versions of lexical decision or naming. This state of affairs is consistent with our previous thinking, although, until the current study, we did not have any (even tentative) means of separating the input and output components of the recognition process. The picture that emerges from our studies is one of widespread partial activation of information. The system cannot know ahead of time just what information will turn out to be crucial, so this would seem to be a reasonable course of action. Evidently, either the computational costs are minimal (there is much that researchers still must learn about processing) or the information gained is worth spending resources on.
The account we offer is a complex one, but we believe it is plausible and testable. First, the perceptual system seems to have a general predisposition to approach. Usefulness effects are generally large in our studies, and some theorists have argued that in affectively neutral situations, there is some output from a positive affect channel, which leads to approach behaviors. This is thought to foster exploratory behavior and encourage organisms to look for novel opportunities (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999) . This predisposition is moderated by subjective danger, as shown by the Danger ϫ Usefulness interaction found in the current and previous Figure 6 . Predicted accuracy as a function of log danger and usefulness ratings. L means low usefulness, and H means high usefulness (defined as one standard deviation below and above the median, respectively). Neither danger nor usefulness was dichotomized for the statistical analysis. Data are from the noisy naming task. studies (Wurm, 2007; Wurm & Vakoch, 2000) . Specifically, in the context of high usefulness, increasing danger slows RTs, and while the effect on accuracy is generally not significant, it tends toward worse performance. When recognition is made much more difficult, we see a different result. Here, we find that the perceptual system is especially fast and accurate at recognizing items high on usefulness in this context of increasing danger. Whether this reflects a guessing bias, differences in recognition thresholds or resting activation levels, or (as we have argued) lexical coding of this semantic information, we cannot definitively say without additional studies. What this suggests, though, is that the often-observed RT cost for these items in standard lexical decision or naming probably stems from an output process (response conflict) rather than an input process (recognition difficulty). That is, conflicting real-world responses (approach and withdraw) may be appropriate for these stimuli, and evidence of this conflict shows up in the RTs.
How could approach/withdraw processes interact to influence performance? We do not believe it necessarily has anything to do with representing orthography or translating it into phonology because most of our work has used auditory stimuli. However, because we have seen such effects with visual presentation (Wurm, 2006; Wurm, Vakoch, Seaman, & Buchanan, 2004) , the mechanism needs to be applicable to both audition and vision. Similarly, the interaction cannot be dependent on the particular (lab-based) response called for because the effects have been observed with button pressing, speaking, and writing with a pencil. We believe that we can also rule out the idea that words high on both danger and usefulness activate mutually inhibiting semantic representations. The perceptual identification data indicate that when processing is difficult, these semantic representations are mutually beneficial, not mutually inhibiting. The data seem to argue for a more central mechanism for the effects. If we take the perceptual identification data to be the best indicator of what happens in normal word perception, then distributed models in which semantics play a role in the identification process seem promising. Indeed, we have previously argued that a model like that of Gaskell and Marslen-Wilson (1997) might be a possibility because everything that is known about a word (its frequency, its phonology, its meaning, etc.) is captured by the pattern of activation across very many distributed units and activated as a routine part of the recognition process. However, this model seems unsuitable to us now, given the new data provided by the current study. For items high on both danger and usefulness, a workable model needs to predict good accuracy and fast recognition in perceptual identification, and it needs to predict slow recognition and poor (or at least not better) accuracy for the same items in standard lexical decision and naming.
A great many studies have employed dual-task methodologies to explore the role of attention in lexical processing and to differentiate input from output (or central) varieties of attention (e.g., Johnston et al., 1995) . Would it be possible to obtain the observed pattern of results if a distributed model were to feed into a resource-limited central system? Suppose that words high on danger (e.g., electricity, knife) have strong response associations and that these associations consume central/attentional resources. This would delay initiation of a verbal response or button press in standard naming or lexical decision. However, this account cannot explain why the response delay applies only to items that are also Figure 7 . Predicted log naming latency as a function of log danger and usefulness ratings. L means low usefulness, and H means high usefulness (defined as one standard deviation below and above the median, respectively). Neither danger nor usefulness was dichotomized for the statistical analysis. Data are from the noisy naming task. There is a role for attentional allocation in our framework, too. As discussed above, it is possible that processing in standard lexical tasks is so effortless (because it is so highly practiced and overlearned) that attention can be reallocated to other processes, including (pre)programming appropriate motor responses. When more than one class of response is appropriate, these outputs conflict and cost the perceptual system some time. The increased difficulty of the perceptual identification task may prevent this reallocation, so there is no preprogramming and no evidence of the conflict. What is seen instead is believed to be a purer indication of the input portion of the recognition process. This is similar to the logic used in a study by Wurm and Samuel (1997) , in which increasing the attentional load on participants during phoneme monitoring allowed for an assessment of top-down lexical effects that were unobservable in the standard (i.e., easy) version of the task. Of course, in the present context, we cannot be sure about an attentional explanation of the data without additional studies designed specifically to manipulate and assess attentional allocation.
Embodied models (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997; Lakoff, 1987) would seem to offer a suitable framework in which to embed the kinds of mechanisms and processes under discussion because they have a natural explanation for why such things should be observed. One could, for example, tie the recognition system much more directly to the muscle outputs (or otherwise acknowledge that these outputs are somehow having an effect on the recognition process). At the very least, data from the current study suggest that theorists should be careful in placing a wall between perception and semantics or between perception and action. Models that emphasize a magic moment of word recognition, before which certain effects are simply not admissible, are probably wrong. The perceptual system seems to be constantly updating dynamic representations at many different levels of analysis (phonological, morphological, lexical, semantic, syntactic) .
To summarize our account, in standard versions of lexical processing tasks such as Experiment 1, diversion of some attentional resources from signal disambiguation (which is very easy in this case) to preprogramming a real-world response could produce poor performance on the primary lexical task. The real-world responses we have in mind relate to approach and withdraw response tendencies and can be traced to a presumed low-level bidirectional link between perception and action, as discussed in embodied models. The disruption caused by this resource diversion should be related to the complexity or ambiguity of the real-world responses that would be appropriate. Thus, in the case of words high on both danger and usefulness, for which both approach and withdraw responses might be appropriate, the disruption is substantial.
When degraded stimuli make signal uptake difficult, we believe that attentional resources would not be diverted from the signaldisambiguation process. Full processing capacity is needed in this case simply to figure out what the stimulus is. In this case, we are allowed to see that these maximally relevant items actually have a preferential recognition status. This is as it should be: If danger and usefulness are dimensions the perceptual system uses to organize semantic connotation, then words high on these dimensions should be afforded special treatment, and the system should be inclined to get them right as quickly as possible.
Other work from our lab indicates that danger and usefulness effects are not limited to nouns. Wurm, Vakoch, Seaman, and Buchanan (2004) selected 65 words pseudorandomly from a large dictionary. The stimulus set was far from ideal in a number of ways, but the same interaction in auditory lexical decision times was found. Wurm (2007) demonstrated the same interaction in auditory lexical decision times for all words from the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2002) for which complete regressor information was available. The interaction held not only for nouns but for verbs and adjectives as well, even after controlling for a large number of potential confounds (including additional effects such as polysemy and age of acquisition that we were not able to control for with the current stimulus set).
Wurm (2007) argued that danger and usefulness are easier to use in causal theoretical frameworks than many of the most widely used alternatives, such as valence and arousal (e.g., Bradley & Lang, 1999; Robinson, Storbeck, Meier, & Kirkeby, 2004) and evaluation, potency, and activity (e.g., Osgood, 1969) . In addition to being more easily interpretable, danger and usefulness explain at least as much variance as these established frameworks (1.5% more than valence and arousal in Wurm, 2007; 5 .5% more than evaluation, potency, and activity in the current study).
It will be worthwhile to perform detailed analyses of just what is being rated when participants give danger and usefulness ratings. These ratings are moderately correlated with other dimensions of semantics/connotation/emotion (but as just noted, they seem to explain more variance in online recognition performance). We know what instructions are given to participants, but of course we do not know precisely how participants arrive at the values they provide. With polysemous words, for example, do they compute a sort of average? Perhaps they use the first value that comes to mind? Or do they search their memories and see how easily a situation can be imagined that would lead to an extreme rating? There are many possibilities.
The current study has a number of implications for experimental tasks. For researchers who want to avoid lexical decision but who want to use auditory presentation of stimuli, we have shown that auditory naming is a viable task. Taft, Castles, Davis, and Lazendic (2006) argued that the task cannot be used to show even simple effects like item length and frequency, but the current study clearly shows that this is not correct (provided one does not present pseudowords or words very low in frequency to the participants). A more profound implication follows from the fact that naming data, just like lexical decision data, show effects of things like concreteness, animacy of the referent, danger, and usefulness. If such effects are not permitted in models of word recognition, then the tasks are inappropriate for research on these models.
We have also shown that delayed naming is an appropriate control task for immediate naming and that perceptual identification is another task that can be used to demonstrate underlying semantic effects. In conjunction with other tasks, perceptual identification might prove very useful in providing more detail about how certain effects are to be conceptualized in models.
To specifically test the attentional component of any proposed framework, it would be useful to employ dual-task methodologies in future studies on danger and usefulness. If a reversal of the immediate naming interaction can be created with an attentional manipulation, rather than a noise manipulation, it would argue that the attentional account outlined above is promising. Experiments in which speeded dangerous and useful classifications are pitted directly against each other could be informative in terms of understanding a potential bottleneck.
One limitation of the current study suggests future research possibilities. We cannot be sure that the effects we have discovered are really behavioral (in the perception-for-action sense that we intend). We believe that any alternative explanation of the results is going to be difficult, but nevertheless, additional research using pushing and pulling of levers (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999) or other approach versus withdraw responses will be needed to increase confidence in this aspect of our account. However, we believe that our demonstrations are more powerful than many in the literature, in that we do not use priming, we do not use affectively extreme stimuli, and we do not require any response from participants other than a standard vocal response, button press, or written word.
Methodologies employing event-related potential measurement or imaging technologies could in principle help shed light on our proposed input/output distinction, as these can be done without any overt behavior required of the participant. However, as discussed above, it is possible that participants engage in covert sensorimotor simulation even during tasks that do not require performance of the task in question (e.g., Beilock & Holt, 2007) . Recent studies have shown that even implied action can amplify motoric effects and alter perceptual judgments (e.g., Proffitt, 2006; Tipper, Paul, & Hayes, 2006) . Such studies suggest that it will be difficult to truly separate input from output components in word recognition. Note. Mean danger and usefulness ratings were log transformed in all analyses, as were naming latencies. Mean naming latencies are from Experiment 1. Mean identification rates are from Experiment 3.
